Kris James Mitchener and Kirsten Wandschneider did the math on capital controls, and;
The IMF has recently revised its position on capital controls,
acknowledging that they may help prevent financial crises. This column
examines the effects of capital controls imposed during the Great
Depression. Capital controls appear not to have been successfully used
as tools for rescuing banking systems, stimulating domestic output, or
for raising prices. Rather they appear to have been maintained as a
means for restricting trade and repayment of foreign debts.
Pretty much what Milton said;
Time-series analysis suggests that countries imposing capital controls
did not actively pursue expansionary monetary policy after abandoning
gold. An examination of discount-rate policy of capital-control
countries suggest that, while capital-control countries did not follow
France’s lead and continue to raise rates after imposing controls, they
also did not pursue a discount-rate strategy similar to the US – a
country which floated and then aggressively pursued expansionary
monetary policy. ... the average growth rate in the
money supply of capital-control countries turned positive after their
imposition, but it was slower than the growth rates of either floaters
or gold bloc countries once they finally abandoned. For the countries
that imposed capital controls in 1931 and 1932, these findings are
consistent with a large body of research suggesting that monetary
policies were far too tight in the early 1930s (Eichengreen 1992,
Friedman and Schwartz 1962, Temin 1989) – promoting deflation and, in
some cases, contributing to the collapse of banking systems. In
contrast, countries that moved to floating rates pursued expansionary
monetary policies and appear to have halted further deflation and
declining incomes and production.
Of course, next time could be different!
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